The Role of the United States
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The U.S. involvement in this case stems from not only 9/11 but also a long history of al-Qaeda attacks against U.S. service members, civilians, and interests. Especially since 9/11, American military forces, diplomats, and intelligencepersonnel have operated both unilaterally and in conjunction with local security forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and elsewhere in the world to detect and disrupt terrorist plots. A primary tactic has been killing certain al-Qaeda leaders and a vastly greater number of anonymous militants through drone strikes and other counterterrorism operations.
The principal options available in this case are as follows: |
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Conducting drone strikes on the compound believed to be inhabited by the senior al-Qaeda leader
Drone strikes are relatively low-risk operations (in military tactical terms) that provide a strong chance of eliminating the target if he is present at the compound. A strike would not put American personnel in harm’s way. Additionally, a unique advantage of drones is their ability to loiter and monitor the movements of a target for up to fourteen hours, and the operator can divert drone-fired missiles at the last moment if noncombatants enter the blast radius. Drones are also capable of knocking down doors and killing targeted individuals while leaving those nearby unharmed. Although the missile is precise, drones do pose the risk of killing or injuring any civilians in the immediate area of the strike, and the precision only matters if the intelligence is timely and accurate. Additionally, after a drone strike, it could be impossible to know whether the target or any other specific individual is dead. Finally, given its previous statements about shooting down unauthorized aircraft, the Pakistani government’s response is difficult to predict. A drone strike could therefore further damage this already tumultuous bilateral relationship. Given the full set of options, the question is whether a strike is the best choice in the face of criticism of U.S. drone strikes. |
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Ordering a U.S. special forces raid on the compound
A manned raid offers certain advantages over drone strikes. Primarily, U.S. forces can capture targeted individuals to interrogate them or—as was the case in the bin Laden raid—confirm the identity of individuals killed. U.S. forces can also collect information and equipment that could point to additional al-Qaedamilitants or be instrumental in foiling terrorist plots against the United States, its interests, and its allies. Additionally, personnel can take greater care to protect civilians. However, a raid would expose the individuals involved—and U.S. foreign policy—to extreme risks. In an attempt to rescue U.S. hostage Luke Somers in Yemen in 2014, U.S. Navy SEALs were detected by al-Qaeda militants guarding the targeted compound. The militants shot Somers and another hostage before they could be rescued, and they died soon thereafter. Although no U.S. troops died, the raid, which the Yemeni government authorized, also resulted in Yemeni civilian casualties. In this case, American forces could be killed in a battle at the compound in question or by the Pakistani military should it shoot down U.S. aircraft or otherwise disrupt the mission. Al-Qaeda could also capture members of the raiding party, giving the terrorist organization hostages of incalculable value and immediately presenting the United States with the agonizing choice of how to respond. All of this raises the risk of deeper U.S. involvement. Additionally, given the Pakistani government’s response to the raid on bin Laden’s compound, Pakistan would likely perceive a second high-profile American raid as an intolerable violation of its sovereignty, possibly leading to a rupture that would end what little bilateral cooperation remains. If the United States gives Pakistan prior warning of the mission to avoid such a rupture, elements of Pakistan’s government could pass on the information to al-Qaeda leaders, as has occurred in the past, allowing the target and others to flee. Despite his claimed preference for capturing terrorists over killing them, President Obama cited the risks of using special operations forces in a May 2013 speech, adding that “our operation in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden cannot be the norm.” However, given the urgency of this situation and the downsides of other options, the current situation could call for a raid as an exceptional measure. |
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Asking the Pakistani government to capture or kill the target
This option would spare American lives and eliminate the chance of an irreparable diplomatic breach. However, it also offers a far more uncertain chance of success. The Pakistani government could refuse to pursue the target, or it could agree but tip off the target or execute the mission incompetently. Despite occasional successes, the United States has had a long history of frustration with Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. This frustration has contributed to bilateral tensions and the belief among many American policymakers that the United States needs to pursue major terrorist targets itself.
Doing nothing
Given the drawbacks of the other available options, the president could choose to delay action and continue to monitor the compound. Such a step has the downside of diminishing the utility of timely intelligence and allowing the al-Qaeda leader to continue operating unhindered, possibly leading to an attack on the United States that his death could disrupt. Moreover, similar issues to those considered here are likely to arise the next time intelligence on his location emerges. Given the particular circumstances of this case—including the possible presence of civilians at the targeted site—the president could decide to pass on this opportunity. Possibly, though by no means certainly, the target’s whereabouts and U.S.-Pakistan relations will be more favorable in the future. At times in the past, the United States has also made an effort to carefully consider the consequences of a counterterrorism operation for its relationship with Pakistan. In 2005, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld aborted a large-scale raid on senior al-Qaeda members located in Pakistan’s tribal areas because it had the potential to jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan relations and place many American lives at risk.
This option would spare American lives and eliminate the chance of an irreparable diplomatic breach. However, it also offers a far more uncertain chance of success. The Pakistani government could refuse to pursue the target, or it could agree but tip off the target or execute the mission incompetently. Despite occasional successes, the United States has had a long history of frustration with Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts. This frustration has contributed to bilateral tensions and the belief among many American policymakers that the United States needs to pursue major terrorist targets itself.
Doing nothing
Given the drawbacks of the other available options, the president could choose to delay action and continue to monitor the compound. Such a step has the downside of diminishing the utility of timely intelligence and allowing the al-Qaeda leader to continue operating unhindered, possibly leading to an attack on the United States that his death could disrupt. Moreover, similar issues to those considered here are likely to arise the next time intelligence on his location emerges. Given the particular circumstances of this case—including the possible presence of civilians at the targeted site—the president could decide to pass on this opportunity. Possibly, though by no means certainly, the target’s whereabouts and U.S.-Pakistan relations will be more favorable in the future. At times in the past, the United States has also made an effort to carefully consider the consequences of a counterterrorism operation for its relationship with Pakistan. In 2005, then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld aborted a large-scale raid on senior al-Qaeda members located in Pakistan’s tribal areas because it had the potential to jeopardize U.S.-Pakistan relations and place many American lives at risk.