Recent History
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The United States has employed drones in military operations since the early 1990s, initially for primarily reconnaissance purposes. As armed drones grew more sophisticated, however, they became an increasingly popular tool of U.S. military operations.
The expansion of drone use is tied to the advent of the war on terrorism. Immediately following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed an Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) allowing the president to conduct military operations against those who “planned” the attacks and “harbored” the attackers. The AUMF formed the basis for a U.S.-led offensive in Afghanistan, where the ruling Taliban regime had harbored al-Qaeda. It also paved the way for the first drone strikes. At the same time, President George W. Bush authorized the CIA to conduct targeted killings of al-Qaeda leaders. In November 2001, the United States conducted its first known drone killing in Afghanistan. One year later, the United States conducted its first drone strike outside of a battlefield zone, in Yemen. |
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As al-Qaeda leaders and militants fled Afghanistan in search of a new haven, many moved to Pakistan’s FATA, leading Bush to authorize CIA drone strikes in the area in June 2004. The Bush administration claimed that these counterterrorism operations were needed because of Pakistan’s unwillingness to counter the threat al-Qaeda and other jihadi groups pose. This was itself due to Pakistan’s lack of capacity and reluctance to shift its military focus and capabilities away from its ongoing tensions with India. This unwillingness, which continues to complicate U.S.-Pakistan relations, could also have been partly caused by links between terrorist groups and elements of the Pakistani government.
During the first years of U.S. drone strikes, Pakistan’s military first denied that they occurred, then claimed responsibility, and finally acknowledged in 2006 that they were U.S. strikes. Because the CIA rather than the U.S. military covertly conducted the strikes, the U.S. government could not discuss them publicly. Consequently, the early drone program was shrouded in secrecy, misinformation, and confusion. In 2005, after a Pakistani journalist published photos of Hellfire missile fragments at the site of an attack that killed a senior member of al-Qaeda, and as it became more obvious that the United States conducted the operations, the Pakistani public grew to strongly oppose the strikes. Throughout his administration, however, Bush did not publicly acknowledge the United States’ drone use. |
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Drone warfare evolved relatively slowly at first. Between 2004 and 2009, the CIA carried out fifty-one reported drone strikes in Pakistan. Initially, the Bush administration used drones sparingly, carrying out targeted strikes against known individuals and informing Pakistani military and intelligence officials of each strike. In 2008, however, the Bush administration escalated its drone use in Pakistan, ceasing the practice of notifying Pakistani officials of strikes and authorizing the CIA to begin conducting signature strikes.
The Obama administration significantly escalated the global war on terror and correspondingly vastly expanded the scope and scale of drone warfare. Between 2009 and 2016, the Obama administration authorized at least 542 drone strikes, killing 3,797 people, including at least 324 civilians. During its first term, the Obama administration also greatly expanded the practice of signature strikes. Under Obama, drone strikes in Pakistan greatly increased, reaching a peak in 2010 when the United States conducted 122 strikes. Obama expanded non-battlefield drone strikes beyond their initial hub of Pakistan. In 2009, AQAP, an offshoot of al-Qaeda, emerged in Yemen. In April of that year, the U.S. military along with the CIA began expanding U.S. activity in Yemen, including by providing special operations training and conducting drone strikes against AQAP members. In September 2011, a U.S. drone strike in Yemen targeted a senior al-Qaeda recruiter and spokesperson, Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S. citizen. The strike raised questions about the legality of carrying out targeted killings against a U.S. citizen, denying him the constitutional right to due process, and drew increased attention to U.S drone strike policy both domestically and abroad. In 2011, drone strikes also expanded into Somalia, where U.S. special operations forces had been fighting al-Qaeda and an allied group, al-Shabab, since 2007. Between 2011 and 2016, the Obama administration authorized at least forty-two drone strikes in Somalia. |
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Obama also took steps to formalize the process of conducting drone strikes. In May 2013, Obama announced a series of reforms to his administration’s counterterrorism policies. His guidelines called for transferring CIA drones to the military, noted a preference for capturing suspected terrorists rather than killing them, and stated that targets must present a “continuing, imminent threat to Americans.” This indicated an end to the controversial practice of signature strikes, though this has never been confirmed, just as the actual practice of signature strikes has never been acknowledged. On July 1, 2016, the Obama administration released two notable documents as part of its drone strike reforms: an executive order that detailed policies intended to add transparency to the program and safeguard against civilian casualties, and a report [PDF] listing the numbers of strikes (473), combatants killed (between 2,372 and 2,581), and civilians killed (64–116) between January 20, 2009, and December 31, 2015. These estimated ranges were far lower than those provided by nongovernmental organizations.
Under the Trump administration, the number of strikes carried out in Pakistan declined. However, U.S. drone operations continued, and even increased, elsewhere in the world. In Somalia, for instance, the United States conducted at least 202 drone strikes during the Trump administration, a more than fourfold increase from the Obama administration. Trump also walked back many of the Obama-era regulations on drone warfare, eliminating annual public reporting requirements on U.S. drone strikes and the number of civilian casualties they cause; allowing a more lenient vetting process for potential strikes; and authorizing strikes that target low-level soldiers, not just senior militant leaders. Subsequent reporting has also revealed that the administration frequently made exceptions to its requirement for “near certainty” that a strike would cause no civilian casualties. In March 2019, the CIA once again sought to broaden its secret drone strikes against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, including by establishing a new drone base in Niger.
On January 3, 2020, amid worsening tensions between the United States and Iran, the Trump administration launched a targeted drone strike on a convoy outside the Baghdad airport that killed Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, the commander of a unit within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) focused on exerting Iranian military influence abroad. The strike marked a significant departure from previous U.S. targeted killings, which have largely avoided organizations with state connections such as Hezbollah or the IRGC. The Trump administration justified the strike by claiming that Soleimani, who led efforts to support and train proxy groups and governments aligned with Iranian interests, was planning an imminent attack on Americans, although no evidence has emerged to support this claim. Nonetheless, the attack drew sharp criticism both domestically and abroad and increased uncertainty about how the targeted drone strikes will continue.
The Trump administration also relaxed restrictions on the sale of armed drones abroad. For decades, the United States included armed drones under Cold War–era arms control standards governing guided missiles, which dramatically limited their sale to foreign governments. In July 2020, however, the Trump administration announced that it would reinterpret those standards, allowing the United States to export armed drones to a wider array of buyers. Following this change, the Trump administration announced a $2.9 billion drone sale to the United Arab Emirates.
After taking office in January 2021, President Joe Biden has launched a formal review of Trump-era drone practices and has implemented interim guidance that reinstates some Obama-era limitations on non-battlefield drone strikes. This includes strengthening requirements for CIA or military personnel to obtain authorization from the White House before conducting drone strikes. As of May 2021, however, Biden has yet to announce comprehensive guidance on how U.S. drone operations will proceed during his administration.
As the Biden administration considers its drone policies, it will also need to contend with a changing counterterrorism landscape. U.S. counterterrorism priorities continue to spread beyond the Middle East. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has signaled that the Biden Administration will continue and deepen the Trump administration’s counterterrorism efforts in West Africa. Meanwhile, in April 2021, Biden announced plans to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, finalizing a drawdown that began under the Trump administration. The withdrawal of military capacity is likely to have lasting implications for other counterterrorism operations in the region, including drone strikes.
Under the Trump administration, the number of strikes carried out in Pakistan declined. However, U.S. drone operations continued, and even increased, elsewhere in the world. In Somalia, for instance, the United States conducted at least 202 drone strikes during the Trump administration, a more than fourfold increase from the Obama administration. Trump also walked back many of the Obama-era regulations on drone warfare, eliminating annual public reporting requirements on U.S. drone strikes and the number of civilian casualties they cause; allowing a more lenient vetting process for potential strikes; and authorizing strikes that target low-level soldiers, not just senior militant leaders. Subsequent reporting has also revealed that the administration frequently made exceptions to its requirement for “near certainty” that a strike would cause no civilian casualties. In March 2019, the CIA once again sought to broaden its secret drone strikes against al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, including by establishing a new drone base in Niger.
On January 3, 2020, amid worsening tensions between the United States and Iran, the Trump administration launched a targeted drone strike on a convoy outside the Baghdad airport that killed Iranian general Qasem Soleimani, the commander of a unit within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) focused on exerting Iranian military influence abroad. The strike marked a significant departure from previous U.S. targeted killings, which have largely avoided organizations with state connections such as Hezbollah or the IRGC. The Trump administration justified the strike by claiming that Soleimani, who led efforts to support and train proxy groups and governments aligned with Iranian interests, was planning an imminent attack on Americans, although no evidence has emerged to support this claim. Nonetheless, the attack drew sharp criticism both domestically and abroad and increased uncertainty about how the targeted drone strikes will continue.
The Trump administration also relaxed restrictions on the sale of armed drones abroad. For decades, the United States included armed drones under Cold War–era arms control standards governing guided missiles, which dramatically limited their sale to foreign governments. In July 2020, however, the Trump administration announced that it would reinterpret those standards, allowing the United States to export armed drones to a wider array of buyers. Following this change, the Trump administration announced a $2.9 billion drone sale to the United Arab Emirates.
After taking office in January 2021, President Joe Biden has launched a formal review of Trump-era drone practices and has implemented interim guidance that reinstates some Obama-era limitations on non-battlefield drone strikes. This includes strengthening requirements for CIA or military personnel to obtain authorization from the White House before conducting drone strikes. As of May 2021, however, Biden has yet to announce comprehensive guidance on how U.S. drone operations will proceed during his administration.
As the Biden administration considers its drone policies, it will also need to contend with a changing counterterrorism landscape. U.S. counterterrorism priorities continue to spread beyond the Middle East. U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has signaled that the Biden Administration will continue and deepen the Trump administration’s counterterrorism efforts in West Africa. Meanwhile, in April 2021, Biden announced plans to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, finalizing a drawdown that began under the Trump administration. The withdrawal of military capacity is likely to have lasting implications for other counterterrorism operations in the region, including drone strikes.