Root Causes
|
The Global War on Terror
At the heart of the controversies surrounding U.S. drone use is the set of priorities that have guided U.S. counterterrorism practice since 2001. Following the 9/11 attacks, the United States made it a core foreign policy priority to pursue and destroy global terrorist groups. The resulting conflict lacked many of the characteristic elements of a traditional war. It had no well-defined enemies and transcended geographic boundaries. Accordingly, the war on terrorism has been borne out across multiple countries, including Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. The war has also played out across multiple U.S. agencies, using a variety of tactics. These include traditional combat operations, most notably in Afghanistan; diplomatic efforts, including assistance and cooperation to partners such as Pakistan; and, crucially, small-scale covert operations, including using drones to conduct targeted killings. Drones present a valuable tool in an environment of diffuse and covert warfare. Their ability to carry out small, precise strikes greatly facilitates the United States’ ability to carry out counterterrorism operations in non-battlefield zones, where it could otherwise have needed to establish a larger military footprint. |
|
|
Many of the controversies surrounding drone use are rooted in the justifications behind the war on terrorism. U.S. policymakers have asserted that the United States remains in a state of armed conflict with al-Qaeda and other terroristorganizations. Under both the 2001 AUMF and international law, the United States is therefore authorized to conduct military operations in pursuit of those responsible for the 9/11 attacks, wherever they may be. This argument, which forms the legal basis of U.S. targeted killings, remains controversial. Many critics of U.S. targeted killings counter that the interpretation of the AUMF guiding these strikes has extended beyond the authorization’s original limits. Moreover, critics claim that although some targeted killings of al-Qaeda members could be justified, many, especially those of lower-level militants or those involved in groups other than al-Qaeda, do not constitute a necessary or proportionate use of force [PDF] in response to an armed attack as outlined by international law.
|
|
Paradoxical Counterterrorism Cooperation
The United States relies on cooperation with its partners to combat terrorism, by either facilitating U.S operations or conducting operations of their own. Often, however, this cooperation can prove paradoxical. Countries that provide vital support to U.S. efforts are imperfect partners, frequently unable or unwilling to conduct robust counterterrorism operations of their own. Occasionally, U.S. counterterrorism partners simultaneously support U.S. interests and facilitate the presence of terrorist groups within their borders.
In Yemen, for instance, U.S. government officials have described counterterrorism cooperation as ”episodic at best,” pointing to numerous instances of detained al-Qaeda members being released or escaping from custody in Yemen. In Pakistan, the United States has invested considerably in counterterrorism cooperation. In 2004, Bush named Pakistan a major non-NATO ally, expanding the country’s eligibility for foreign aid and defense cooperation. Meanwhile, the United States radically expanded humanitarian and military aid, from $236 million in fiscal year 2001, before the 9/11 attacks, to $1.1 billion the next year and $3 billion by fiscal year 2010. Despite this extensive support, however, Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations have largely failed, and U.S. officials determined that the Inter-Services Intelligence—the national security intelligence branch of the Pakistani government—would sometimes tip off targeted individuals if notified of impending drone strikes in advance. To date, Pakistan remains on the Financial Action Task Force’s terrorism financing “gray list,” signifying that Islamabad’s efforts to curb money laundering and the financing of terrorism are insufficient.
The mistrust that often characterizes the relationships between the United States and its counterterrorism partners makes unilateral action, such as drone strikes, a more attractive tool. However, such unilateral action can complicate already tense bilateral relationships. Drone strikes in particular place considerable strain on bilateral relations. Yemeni and Pakistani officials have both issued sharp condemnations of U.S. drone strikes; Pakistani officials have at times called for the practice to end completely within their borders in order for cooperation on other issues to continue. Ensuring counterterrorism operations have the highest possible chance of success while also sustaining relationships with partners that enable those operations to occur in the first place requires considerable diplomatic and financial resources and remains a significant dilemma for policymakers considering the future of U.S. counterterrorism operations.
The United States relies on cooperation with its partners to combat terrorism, by either facilitating U.S operations or conducting operations of their own. Often, however, this cooperation can prove paradoxical. Countries that provide vital support to U.S. efforts are imperfect partners, frequently unable or unwilling to conduct robust counterterrorism operations of their own. Occasionally, U.S. counterterrorism partners simultaneously support U.S. interests and facilitate the presence of terrorist groups within their borders.
In Yemen, for instance, U.S. government officials have described counterterrorism cooperation as ”episodic at best,” pointing to numerous instances of detained al-Qaeda members being released or escaping from custody in Yemen. In Pakistan, the United States has invested considerably in counterterrorism cooperation. In 2004, Bush named Pakistan a major non-NATO ally, expanding the country’s eligibility for foreign aid and defense cooperation. Meanwhile, the United States radically expanded humanitarian and military aid, from $236 million in fiscal year 2001, before the 9/11 attacks, to $1.1 billion the next year and $3 billion by fiscal year 2010. Despite this extensive support, however, Pakistan’s counterterrorism operations have largely failed, and U.S. officials determined that the Inter-Services Intelligence—the national security intelligence branch of the Pakistani government—would sometimes tip off targeted individuals if notified of impending drone strikes in advance. To date, Pakistan remains on the Financial Action Task Force’s terrorism financing “gray list,” signifying that Islamabad’s efforts to curb money laundering and the financing of terrorism are insufficient.
The mistrust that often characterizes the relationships between the United States and its counterterrorism partners makes unilateral action, such as drone strikes, a more attractive tool. However, such unilateral action can complicate already tense bilateral relationships. Drone strikes in particular place considerable strain on bilateral relations. Yemeni and Pakistani officials have both issued sharp condemnations of U.S. drone strikes; Pakistani officials have at times called for the practice to end completely within their borders in order for cooperation on other issues to continue. Ensuring counterterrorism operations have the highest possible chance of success while also sustaining relationships with partners that enable those operations to occur in the first place requires considerable diplomatic and financial resources and remains a significant dilemma for policymakers considering the future of U.S. counterterrorism operations.